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ABSTRACT 
Malware is software that enables adversaries to execute their goals by affecting 
their target devices’ confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Malware is 
constantly evolving and detection methods must find ways to detect the new variants. 
This research developed a new method of detecting malware using a neural-network 
architecture.   The method is not signature-based, unlike most existing methods, 
and would aid in finding previously unseen malware. It analyzes software 
using three separate static-analysis methods to obtain a list of features, which 
when input into the neural network are used to classify the software as malware or not 
malware. The three methods were the binary-to-grayscale, statistical-N-grams, and 
dynamic-link-libraries. The binary-to-grayscale approach performed poorly. The 
other two strategies performed better, but had room for improvement; statistical-N-
grams and dynamic-link-libraries showed complementary results that suggest combining 
them would yield a more effective detection method. 
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Malware is software that intends to act in a harmful or intrusive manner toward a 
target computer device. Categories of malware are Trojan horses, viruses, worms, 
ransomware, spyware, adware, rootkits, keyloggers, and backdoors. Malware enables 
adversaries to execute their goals against a target, allowing them to compromise the 
device’s computer-security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
Computer scientists over the years have developed detection techniques to 
identify malware executables (binaries). Traditionally, antivirus software relies on 
signatures to identify malware. A signature is a unique pattern of bits that can identify a 
file, like a fingerprint. However, like the flu virus, malware may be designed to mutate to 
help it survive and fool a system’s detection mechanisms while retaining its functionality. 
A few minor modifications to malware can change its signatures and that often suffices to 
cause a signature-based detection system to fail. 
As computation speed has increased and machine-learning algorithms have 
gained popularity, antivirus detection has evolved in its scope to attempt detection of 
malware previously unidentified (zero days) using signatures. To aid in this 
identification, various machine-learning algorithms are available. These algorithms have 
gained wide use in fields such as marketing, finance, genetics, and manufacturing. Data is 
analyzed to obtain a set of features that are then used as input to predict a result. Usually, 
the algorithms attempt to duplicate a specified set of outputs for a set of inputs given in a 
training set algorithms like support-vector machines, nearest-neighbor inference, and 
Naïve Bayes have been popular (Fatima & Pasha, 2017; Jahan, 2018, Muja & Lowe, 
2014). Lately, the use of neural networks has begun to show promise in a variety of 
applications. 
Neural networks are a form of neural-network learning methods where a network 
is trained on data that have already been classified by a reliable method (has a “ground 
truth”) (Kelleher, Namee, & Darcy, 2015). This study focused on malware identification, 
and the ground truth was the identification of whether a binary image of an executable 
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file was malware or not. The training of supervised models relies on the adjustment of 
weights. A set of input values and a set of weights on them, in multiple layers, are used to 
calculate output values. For training a neural network model with malware and benign 
binaries, a gradient-descent optimization algorithm can modify the weights within the 
“hidden” and “output” layers in the neural network. This adjustment of weights creates a 
non-linear function on the inputs that can extrapolate to new but similar kinds of 
malware. Many types of neural network architectures have evolved over time. 
This thesis did three static analyses that extracted features from executable 
binaries and used them as input to three neural network models in an attempt to identify 
malware. Binaries were restricted to Windows 7 executables. One model used the 
Cuckoo Sandbox software to extract API library calls, another used basic statistical 
analysis of N-grams in the binary, and one used a gray-scale image constructed from the 
binary. The models used feed-forward neural network architectures, and the image model 
also used a convolutional neural network. 
This thesis first discusses the background and the work related to malware 
detection in recent years. Then, the proposed methodology for the study is presented. 
Finally, the results and analysis are provided, along with the code used to obtain the 
results. The binary-to-grayscale image strategy performed the poorest of the three. 
Although the accuracies are not extraordinary, the other two strategies performed 
similarly to each other. The statistical-N-gram and dynamic-link-library strategies may 
even have complementary qualities, which may improve performance in a hybrid neural-







Malware is computer software that performs malicious actions on a victim’s 
computer device without their consent. The actions performed depend on the type of 
malware. The types include ransomware, downloader, bot, dropper, worm, keylogger, or 
adware. Ransomware encrypts a victim’s data and holds the decryption keys for ransom. 
A downloader looks benign, but it will download something more malicious later. A 
“bot” allows malicious remote control of a computer or device. A dropper contains an 
obfuscated malicious binary within itself and “drops” it onto the victim’s computer. A 
worm steals data while propagating across networks. A keylogger tracks the keys typed 
on the victim’s computer. Adware is malicious code that propagates advertisements on a 
computer device.  
In the past five years, the number of malware samples per year registered by AV-
TEST Institute has increased over 262%, from 326 million samples detected in 2015 to 
856 million samples detected in 2018 (AV-Test, 2018). As the number of devices 
connected to the Internet continues to increase, there will likely be corresponding 
increases of the number of malware infections on those devices. Not only has the total 
amount of malware increased, so has the number of distinct variants (Symantec, 2018).  
Due to their simplicity and performance, signatures (distinctive bit patterns of 
known malware) are the most commonly used way to detect malware. However, 
signatures can only detect previously identified malware pieces; they have difficulty 
detecting new malware and variants of old malware with the same functionality 
(Symantec, 2018). The only way to really be sure about a suspicious binary would be to 
have it reviewed by an analyst who would likely use a combination of static and dynamic 
analysis techniques. Static analysis is the technique of analyzing the suspected malware 
without executing it. The binary can be disassembled to examine the instructions, file 
headers, program sections, import libraries, and statistical inferences. Authors of 
malicious binaries often understand static-analysis techniques and try to defeat detection 
measures using anti-analysis techniques such as obfuscation of the executable code. 
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Malware analysts can also examine a suspicious binary using dynamic methods 
within a “sandbox” environment. A sandbox is a separate environment that isolates the 
executing binary from affecting anything outside the environment. Although very 
effective, analysis may take days depending on the length and complexity of the binary. 
Having analysts review every binary that enters the network is not cost-effective. 
Automating this would require intelligent data analytics and computing ability 
comparable to the human analyst. Identifying malware is complex; for instance, a 
malware binary executing on one platform may provide different results than when it 
executes on a different platform. Therefore, we must construct models for each platform 
and its intricacies.  
This study examined Windows “portable executables” (PE file format). The 
Windows operating system is widely distributed across the globe and a popular target for 
attacks. When new files are introduced to a Windows system through downloads or 
storage transfer, they are usually analyzed by installed security software. This may 
include anti-virus software residing on the host system or an intrusion-detection system at 
the point of transfer. 
N-grams are a sequences of N successive items of a sample. Statistical analysis on 
N-grams is often done in static analysis of the byte sequence of a binary. Analysis of 
sequences is used across a variety of domains including speech recognition, biology, and 
chemistry; an example in biochemistry is looking for common amino acid strings 
(Osmanbeyoglu, 2011). For image analysis, the technique has gained much popularity in 
recent years due to its performance and accuracy; one project used N-grams in gray-scale 
images to detect objects in images (Bui, Lech, Cheng, Neville, & Burnett, 2016). 
Artificial neural networks were first introduced in 1958 by psychologist Frank 
Rosenblatt (Rosenblatt, 1958). However, they did not garner much attention until their 
recent success use with image and speech recognition. This has led researchers to 
experiment with the models and apply them to problems in many fields. In particular, 
convolutional neural networks have gained much attention for the task of image 
classification. An example of early convolutional neural networks (Cun, 1994) classified 
numbers. The network was greatly improved upon during the ImageNet competition in 
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2012 with the iteration called AlexNet (Krizhevsky, 2017), which added layers of 
convolution and pooling. It could classify more complex objects and object hierarchies. 
Convolutional neural networks have been applied mainly to image recognition and 
natural-language processing. In cybersecurity, neural networks are used to analyze 
network traffic, system logs, and binaries to detect malicious activity (Kolosnjaji, Zarras, 
Webster, & Eckert, 2016; Lopez-Martin, 2017). 
Static analysis on N-grams of disassembled binaries was performed by Hassen et 
al. (Hassen, Carvalho, & Chan, 2017). N-grams are a connected sequence of N terms of a 
sample; in our case, the terms are bytes. The study analyzed the binaries for N-gram 
features and applied random-forest and logistic-regression machine-learning models. 
They created frequency arrays for 2-gram, 3-gram, and 4-gram control-statement 
sequences. In addition, because many 4-gram and some 3-gram sequences were never 
observed, the study hashed the gram values into a smaller bit space; for example, 2-grams 
on bytes have 16 bits but were hashed to a 12-bit space. This thesis explored creating a 
smaller array space by focusing only on N-grams that occur most frequently, outside 
three standard deviations from the mean, were unique to either malware or benign 
samples. 
Other work (Gong, 2016) that attempted to detect malware in Windows portable 
executable files took three static approaches to obtaining features. One approach 
extracted the dynamic-link libraries used by the binary, another extracted particular 
strings in the binary, and another identified 2-gram sequences from random subsets of the 
binary. To extract the dynamic link libraries, the researchers use objdump (Stallman, 
1984). The terms and their frequency were recorded for all executables. Their analysis 
resulted in a feature set size of 414 of the most frequent DLL references discovered 
within their sample of executables. This is done in this thesis except fewer DLL 
references will be sought. In addition, this thesis also used section names, the total 
number of sections, and the average entropy across all sections to help distinguish 
executables. The study’s third technique, identifying 2-grams from a random subset of 
the binary, is also a bag-of-words style feature set. The bag-of-words approach operates 
by identifying a set of terms and recording the frequency of each term. It is considered a 
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“bag” because the order of the terms does not matter. This thesis also identified 2-grams 
from the binary in a bag-of-words fashion.  
Other work did malware classification by converting a binary into a gray-scale 
image, and then running it through a K-nearest-neighbors algorithm (Nataraj, 2011). The 
dataset was comprised of various families of malware without benign samples. The 
objective was to classify the malware as a backdoor, worm, Trojan, dialer, Trojan 
downloader, password stealer, or another of the 25 families they studied. The gray-scale 
image was created by interpreting each byte as a pixel value in the range 0–255; it was 
sampled, by taking the average of evenly spaced locations, to reach a feature set size of 
320, then used as input for the K-nearest neighbor algorithm. The classification reached 
accuracies above 98%. A similar malware classification on the Microsoft Kaggle 
classification challenge dataset was done in Gibert (2016) and Microsoft (2015). They 
modified the gray scale approach by sampling to a feature set size of 1024 to represent a 
32 x 32 image where each feature was a gray-scale pixel ranging from 0–255. Then the 
image was used as input for several convolutional neural network architectures. This 
work was adapted again for the use of malware detection (Kalash et al., 2018). This thesis 
sampled to a 1024 feature set with each pixel value ranging from 0–65535 so the gray-
scale range was extended to 16 bits instead of the 8 used in the previous studies. 
Nvidia, a producer of graphics processing units (GPUs), has published work in 
malware detection using similar algorithms on GPUs (Raff, 2017). This analyzed the 
entire binary’s raw bytes and input the information into various neural network 
architectures. One architecture featured a raw byte embedding strategy and another used 
a chunking strategy. This thesis took a simpler approach to the architecture and with 
sampling. 
Another study translated the bytes to machine language op codes and library calls 
as a primitive kind of disassembly before attempting to detect malware (Zak, 2017). They 
studied three methods: translation to instructions, translation to instruction-parameter 
types, and translation to function calls (El-Sherei, n.d.). Each N-gram was analyzed, 
translated, and input to a logistic regression model. 1-gram and 2-gram features were 
used in all three models; 3-gram and 4-gram features were used in the instruction 
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parameter type and function call translations; and 5-gram and 6-gram features were used 
for function-call translations. 
Attackers often employ obfuscation techniques that only become apparent when 
the binary is executed. For this reason, researchers have also explored dynamic features 
such as the sequence of system calls (Kolosnjaji, Zarras, Webster, & Eckert, 2016; Pfoh, 
Schneider, & Eckert, 2013; Attaluri, Mcghee, & Stamp, 2008). There have also been 
combinations of static and dynamic analysis using convolutional neural networks and 
feed-forward neural networks (Kolosnjaji et al., 2017). 
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III. METHODS 
A. DATA PREPARATION 
The test set used 5,518 binaries, where 3,251 malware samples were obtained 
from VirusShare and the other 2,267 were benign samples. All the malware was 
Windows PE files (VirusShare, 2018). The 2,267 samples labeled as benign were 
executables that were extracted from classroom computers and the NPS forensic 
collection DEEP (McCarrin, Gera, Rowe, & Allen, 2017). No benign samples were 
known malware. The malware obtained from VirusShare were confirmed as malware by 
several antivirus sources including Symantec, BitDefender, Microsoft, McAfee, and 
Kaspersky. 
The programs that performed the analysis were written in the Python 
programming language. The development and testing were done on an Ubuntu Linux 
distribution to avoid accidental contamination of the Windows malware since most 
malware is unlikely to infect a Linux system. Three separate analysis strategies were 
used. One converted a binary to a gray-scale image, one used statistical methods, and one 
identified the dynamic-link libraries and sections of the binaries. The gray-scale method 
and the statistical method were completed solely within the Linux environment using 
Python. However, the identification of dynamic-link libraries and sections in the binary 
used the Cuckoo Sandbox environment (Cuckoo, 2018) set up in a virtual machine using 
VMware with a Windows 7 Professional operating system.  
The binary to gray-scale analysis required preparation of the data. A directory 
with the test set was the input to the program. Then, each executable in the directory was 
read byte-by-byte as a binary number. A “summary” image of 32 x32 pixels, or 1024 
bytes, was calculated by averaging the bytes within the sub-windows, where the window 
size was proportional to the size of the file. Each 32 x 32 array was attached to a larger 




 The sequence of steps from the binary samples to training 
the neural network using subsampled gray-scale images. 
When a binary file was opened, if its size was less than 2048, no subsampling 
occurred. Instead, every two bytes were treated as a 16-bit integer value, and the 
remaining spaces were assigned zeros. If the initial size is greater than 2048, the size was 
divided by 2048 and the result ignoring any fractional remainder was the number of 16-
bit values that were averaged together. For example, a modulo result from a file size of 
5,000 and the modulo parameter of 2,048 is 2.44. Truncating the decimal results in the 
integer 2 as the subsampling variable, so every two 16-bit values were averaged together 
and the remaining 904 bytes were dropped. The result is an array of 1024 16-bit values 
that is used as input for the neural network. 
The statistical method analyzed the binaries to extract N-grams that were input for 
machine learning. N-grams are N consecutive bytes in a sample. A feature-set array was 
created containing particular N-grams that were statistically significant for malware in 
the data. The data samples were split into two subsets, malware and benign. Four 
dictionaries for each subset were used to record the frequency of 1-grams, 2-grams, 3-
grams, and 4-grams. A scoring system was used to choose the N-grams added to the 
feature set using the distance of the malware fraction from the expected value in units of 
standard deviation calculated within each dictionary. N-grams with scores greater than 
three standard deviations from the mean were stored in an array we will call the feature 
set. Originally, the feature set had 32,768 N-grams which was far too large for 
processing. To reduce it, 3-grams were limited to the top 50 scores and 4-grams were 
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limited to the top 100 scores. The feature set was reduced to a total of 185 features to 
avoid overfitting. Of the 185 chosen, thirty-five were 2-grams, fifty were 3-grams, one-
hundred were 4-grams, and no 1-grams. 
To analyze a binary, the program extracted each N-gram in the binary and 
recorded its existence with the integer 1 in a separate array of length equal to the feature 
set array. Each binary was thus represented by a feature array of 1’s and 0’s. The 
processing sequence can be seen in Figure 2.  
 
 The sequence of steps from binary samples to training the 
neural network using n-gram features. 
Identification of dynamic-link libraries and sections within the binary was done 
with the Cuckoo sandbox environment (Cuckoo, 2018). The Cuckoo agent was installed 
on the Windows 7 system on a VMware virtual machine (VMware, 2018); Ubuntu was 
the base operating system used. The Cuckoo package “exe” was used to analyze each 
sample binary (Automated Process, 2015). Its output was a JSON-formatted file reporting 
the dynamic-link libraries identified, the sections, the entropy for each section, and other 
details. The names in JSON reports were counted and stored in a Python dictionary. The 
ten most frequently reported names were included in the feature set for each binary. In 
addition, the average entropy across all sections and the number of sections in the binary 




 The sequence of steps from binary samples to training the 
neural network using dynamic link library and section data.  
B. NEURAL-NETWORK APPLICATION 
At the lowest level, an artificial neuron simulates a biological neuron where the 
dendrites accept an input and the axon outputs a signal (Rosenblatt, 1958). The neurons 
are structured into a network of layers. Typically, a neural network consists of an input 
layer, hidden layer(s), and the output layer. Each layer is fully-connected which means 
nodes (neurons) connect with every node from the previous and subsequent layer. The 
strength of the connection between the nodes is a weight that is determined through the 
training process. Usually, the training process uses backpropagation to adjust the 
weighted values to improve closeness to correct output. Figure 4 shows a typical plan. 
 
 Feed-forward neural network with fully-connected layers. 
Source: IIIT-H Virtual Labs (2018). 
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An enhanced neural-network structure is the convolutional neural network (Cun, 
1994). This structure is common for image classification and was used in our strategy 
that uses gray-scale images converted from binaries. When used for image classification, 
its hidden layers are a combination of convolutional and “pooling” layers followed by a 
“dense” layer. The convolution layer is paired with an activation function and the output 
layer is paired with a logistic function to provide a result between 0–1 for each node in 
the output layer. A convolution is an important technique used in signal processing and is 
defined as an inner product of two signals that form an output signal (Smith, 2012). The 
two incoming signals are the input signal and the impulse signal. For image 
classification, a convolution is where a digital filter (a kernel) is mapped to data and 
corresponding items are multiplied. There are three components in the process: the input 
data, kernel filter, and the output data. For images, the kernel filter is the impulse signal 
in the form of a square matrix. The kernel filter is laid “on top” of the input with the 
center of the filter corresponding to the location of the result in the output image, as 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 Example convolution where the kernel filter, K, is laid on top of the 
image, I, resulting in image, I*K. Source: Spark (2017). 
To ensure the result size has the same size as the input, padding is usually added 
to the input prior to convolution in the form of a border of zeroes around the entire image. 
The convolution operation (layer) is usually followed by an activation function that 
normalizes it. This thesis used the rectified linear unit activation function “ReLU,” which 
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replaces negative numbers with a 0 and retains values greater than or equal to 0. The 
pooling layer is designed to reduce the data size in the number of nodes and parameters. 
The size of reduction is dependent on the size of the pooling filter and the “stride.” The 
pooling filter is like a border that surrounds a portion of the image, and some function is 
applied to the values within the designated border. In this study, the max pooling method 
was used which results in the maximum value within the border of a set of values. In the 
case of RGB images, each pixel contains three values, one for each color. Therefore, we 
can visualize the images as three layers of pixel values. Max pooling would output the 
maximum value within the set values contained in the specified border for each color 
layer. For our gray-scale images, a single value represents a pixel and therefore max 
pooling operates on the single layer. Thus, with a pooling filter size of 2 × 2, a set of four 
values are compared to determine the maximum value. The maximum value from each 
set is carried to the next layer. The stride determines how many pixels the pooling filter 
shifts between operations. For example, a 2 × 2 max pooling filter applied to a 4 × 4 
image with a stride of 2 would produce the output image shown in Figure 6. 
 
 Max pooling with filter size of 2 × 2, and stride of 2, 
applied to a 4 × 4 image. Li (2018). 
The dense or “fully-connected” layer is where each node from the previous layer 




 Example of a fully-connected layer. Source: Hollemans (2017). 
The output layer makes the classification. This thesis classifies binaries as 
malicious or benign, so there are two output neurons. The likelihood of each node is 
normalized using the logistic function softmax shown in Figure 8. 
 
 Softmax equation where K is the number of nodes in the 
output layer, and z is the value at that particular node. 
The result is a categorical probability distribution represented by values between 
0–1, at each output node. The sum of all output nodes equals 1. The output layer node 
with the largest value is the class that the neural network predicts. Training does 
backpropagation adjusting the weights to make a better prediction the next time. 
C. ARCHITECTURES 
A separate neural network architecture was used for each of the three analysis 
strategies. The binary-to-gray image method used a convolutional neural network and the 
other two strategies used a feed-forward network. The samples were split into 80% 
training and 20% test sets were used with 10-fold validation methods, meaning the 
16 
samples were randomly selected ten ways to avoid overfitting. The binary to gray-scale 
image architecture used a 2-dimensional convolutional neural network similar to one 
used in an example on the TensorFlow website (TensorFlow, 2018). This network design 
was chosen due to its simplicity and previous success with gray-scale images. The neural 
network had two convolutional layers, each followed by a pooling layer, and the final two 
layers were the dense layer and the output layer. The first layer used a kernel size of 5 × 
5, 2 border units of padding, 32 filters, and a ReLU activation layer. There were 32,768 
neurons in this layer and each one contained 25 inputs. Next, there was the pooling layer 
with pool size of 2 × 2 and stride of 2. This pooling layer reduced the image size to 16 
x16 and the size of the layer was 8,192 neurons, each with four inputs. The third layer 
was the second convolutional layer with the same activation and padding but with a 
kernel size of 3 × 3 and 64 filters. There were 16,384 neurons in this layer and each 
contained nine inputs. This was followed by a pooling layer identical to the previous one, 
reducing each image to 8 × 8, and the layer size was 4,096 neurons, each with four 
inputs. A dense layer followed with 1,024 neurons with 4,096 inputs each. The final layer 
was two output neurons with 1,024 inputs each. The model was trained using a gradient-
descent optimizer at a learning rate of 0.01. The neural-network architecture for the N-
gram strategy was a feed-forward model with an input layer taking input of the feature set 
of 185. It contained two hidden layers with sizes 16 and 4, respectively. In a feed-forward 
model, each neuron was connected to each neuron in the previous layer. The output layer 
was two nodes that predicted whether the input sample was malware or not. The model 
was trained using the Adam stochastic optimization algorithm (Kolkiewicz, 2010).  
The neural-network architecture for the dynamic-link library strategy was a feed-
forward model with an input layer having inputs of the feature set of twelve items. It had 
two hidden layers of sizes 6 and 3, respectively. Each neuron in the first layer had twelve 
inputs and second-layer neurons had six inputs. Like the other models, the output layer 
had two neurons that predicted whether the input sample was malware or not. The model 
was trained using the same Adam stochastic optimization algorithm used in the N-gram 
strategy (Kolkiewicz, 2010). The feed-forward architectures were implemented using the 
Python Sci-kit Learn library (Sci-kit Learn, 2018). 
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IV. RESULTS 
The binary-to-grayscale, statistical-N-gram, and dynamic-link-library strategies 
were tested with the previously described neural-network architectures. The binary-to-
grayscale strategy used the convolutional neural network architecture, while both the 
statistical-N-gram and dynamic-link-library strategies used a feed-forward neural 
network with different numbers of nodes per layer. All three architectures had two output 
neurons, one for each designated class, that output a probability value. The larger 
probability of the two output neurons identifies the prediction. The preprocessed inputs 
were split 80% for testing and 20% for training the models and used with the 10-fold 
validation method (that is, with ten random selections of the 80%–20% split).  
The models were evaluated using error-matrix metrics, overall accuracy, and 
average probabilities of the output neurons during testing. The error-matrix metrics 
included true positives, true negatives, false positives, false negatives, precision, recall, 
and f-score. The neural networks were designed such that malware was designated as a 
positive prediction (1), and the benign binary was designated as a negative prediction (0). 
If the neural-network model predicts the binary to be malware (1) and the actual 
classification is malware, it is counted as a true positive. If the prediction is malware and 
the true classification is a benign binary, it is a false positive. If the prediction was a 
benign binary (0) and the true classification is malware, it is a false negative. These three 
metrics provide the parameters for calculating precision, recall and f-score. Precision is 
the fraction of correct predictions of all predictions. Recall is the fraction of correct 
predictions of all positive samples identified. The f-score is a measure of accuracy that 
considers both the precision and recall. The equation is displayed in Figure 9. The generic 
accuracy, total number of samples correctly predicted in either direction divided by the 
total number of tested samples is also used to evaluate the data. 
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 F-score accuracy equation. 
Overall, the dynamic-link-library strategy and the N-gram analysis performed 
similarly by correctly predicting 90% of the samples. The gray-scale image strategy 
performed poorly in recognizing only 56% of the samples. 
A. STRATEGY I: BINARY TO 16-BIT GRAY-SCALE IMAGE 
The strategy of converting a binary to a 16-bit gray-scale image of size 32 × 32, 
from Figure 1, did not perform well. As shown in Table 1, it produced an accuracy of 
56%. Its recall is 100% but that is because no samples were predicted as benign: Every 
input was predicted as malware. In previous work, the convolutional neural networks 
used for malware classification used 8-bit pixel sizes (Kalash et al., 2018; Karaj, 2011) 
rather than 16 bits in our work. Our bit space per pixel was 256 times greater than in the 
previous work. The increased possibilities and the averaging caused by subsampling may 
have caused insufficient information for the neural network to learn.  
Table 1. Accuracy results for the gray-scale-image strategy. 
 
 
B. STRATEGY II: STATISTICAL N-GRAMS  
The strategy of identifying particular N-grams, from Figure 2, predicted the 
correct classification for the binary sample an average of 89% of the time with just over 
1% standard deviation between the test runs as shown in Table 2. The precision is 
recognizably lower than the recall of the model. This means the model identified most 
malware samples but did so while incorrectly predicting a considerable portion of non-
malware as malware, also known as false positives. Table 4 shows the average 
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probabilities of each output neuron. The rows indicate the status of the predictions. When 
the neural network predicted correctly, the probability of the correct neuron is high, 
relative to incorrect predictions, and has a smaller percentage of deviation than when the 
neural network predicted incorrectly. Also, when predicting correctly, the average output 
probability of the malware neuron is higher than the benign neuron.  
Table 2. Accuracy results of the statistical-N-gram strategy 
 
Table 3. Confusion matrix of one of the ten test runs for the 
statistical-N-gram strategy. 
 
Table 4. Average probabilities at each output neuron in the N-gram strategy 
 
 
C. STRATEGY III: DYNAMIC LINK LIBRARIES AND SECTIONS 
The accuracy of the dynamic-link-library strategy, from Figure 3, performed 
similarly to the previous strategy in correctly classifying an average of 90% of the binary 
samples as shown in Table 5. The precision is noticeably higher than the recall. This 
means that when the model predicts the binary as malware, it is often correct. However, it 
does not properly identify more than 13% of the malware samples. The output neuron 
probabilities in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 4 such that the probabilities are 
relatively high, with little deviation, when correctly predicting the classification. The 
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difference is that, when correctly predicting the class, the malware neuron averages a 
higher probability.  
Table 5. Accuracy results of the dynamic-link-library strategy 
 
Table 6. Confusion matrix  
 






Two strategies performed at an accuracy of around 90% while the third strategy 
performed poorly. The binary-to-grayscale image-conversion strategy lost information 
during the conversion process and extracted too-sparse data, contributing to its poor 
performance. Large binaries are very susceptible to information loss; for example, a 
binary of size 8 KB would require averaging four 16-bit values, and the average is not 
often unique.  
The statistical-N-gram strategy and the dynamic-link-library strategy had overall 
similar performance but had different performance in precision and recall. The N-gram 
strategy resulted in a better recall than precision whereas the dynamic-link-library 
strategy had better recall. The probabilities of the output neurons in the two strategies 
were higher, with less deviation, when the model correctly predicted the class. Although 
the strategies performed at around 90% in accuracy, previous work found better-
performing strategies (Kolosnjaji et al., 2017; Raff, 2017). Raff et al. were able to 
achieve a 94% accuracy using their set of 2 million binary samples. Using a hybrid neural 
network consisting of feed-forward and convolutional architectures, Kolosnjaji et al. 
achieved a classification accuracy of 92%.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
Our results were encouraging, but further improvements are possible. The number 
of features and the hidden-layer sizes can be adjusted for the two feed-forward neural-
network strategies. However, the possibility of overfitting must be considered. In 
particular, the number of weights between the inputs and the first layer must never 
exceed the number of data samples, so increasing the number of data samples would be 
beneficial.  
Because the precision and recall for the two feed-forward neural-network 
strategies are opposite of one another, it could be useful to combine the two strategies in 
some way such as adding their outputs or combining them with additional neurons.  
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APPENDIX.  NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES 




import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 








    benign_dir ='/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/Binaries/' 
    directory=benign_dir 
    output_value=0 
    pickle_in="/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/bin2img_B_input" 
    pickle_out="/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/bin2img_B_output" 
    print('BENIGN START') 
 
if MALWARE: 
    malware_dir = '/home/nps/Documents/Malware/Virus.Win/' 
    directory=malware_dir 
    output_value=1 
    pickle_in="/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/bin2img_M_input" 
    pickle_out="/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/bin2img_M_output" 









for filename in os.listdir(directory): 
    full_path = directory + filename 
    if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
        with open(full_path,"rb") as binary_file: 
            del vectors16[:] 
            data=binary_file.read() 
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            file_size=os.stat(full_path).st_size 
            modulo_result=file_size%2048 
            block_size=file_size//2048 
            binary_file.seek(0) 
            if block_size==0: 
                block_size=1 
             
            for v in range(1024): 
                avg=0 
                for x in range(block_size): 
                    bytes16=binary_file.read(1) 
                    if len(bytes16) < 1: 
                        break 
                    g1=ord(struct.unpack('c',bytes16)[0])*256 
                    bytes16=binary_file.read(1) 
                    if len(bytes16) < 1: 
                        break 
                    avg=ord(struct.unpack('c',bytes16)[0]) + g1 
                
                col=v%32 
                row=v//32 
                vectors16.append(avg/block_size) 
                v16[row,col]=avg/block_size 
 
 
            nvectors16=np.array(vectors16) 
            v16x.append(np.copy(nvectors16)) 





pickle.dump(npVec16, open(pickle_in, "wb")) 
pickle.dump(out_arr, open(pickle_out, "wb")) 
 
 





from __future__ import absolute_import 
from __future__ import division 
from __future__ import print_function 
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split 
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import numpy as np 





def cnn_model_fn(features, labels, mode): 
 
    input_layer = tf.reshape(features["x"], [-1, 32, 32, 1]) 
 
    # Convolutional Layer #1 
    conv1 = tf.layers.conv2d( 
      inputs=input_layer, 
      filters=32, 
      kernel_size=[5, 5], 
      padding="same", 
      activation=tf.nn.relu) 
 
    # Pooling Layer #1 
    pool1 = tf.layers.max_pooling2d(inputs=conv1, pool_size=[2, 2], strides=2) 
 
    # Convolutional Layer #2 and Pooling Layer #2 
    conv2 = tf.layers.conv2d( 
      inputs=pool1, 
      filters=64, 
      kernel_size=[3, 3], 
      padding="same", 
      activation=tf.nn.relu) 
    pool2 = tf.layers.max_pooling2d(inputs=conv2, pool_size=[2, 2], strides=2) 
 
    # Dense Layer 
    pool2_flat = tf.reshape(pool2, [-1, 8 * 8 * 64]) 
    dense = tf.layers.dense(inputs=pool2_flat, units=1024, activation=tf.nn.relu) 
    dropout = tf.layers.dropout( 
      inputs=dense, rate=0.4, training=mode == tf.estimator.ModeKeys.TRAIN) 
 
    # Logits Layer 
    logits = tf.layers.dense(inputs=dropout, units=2) 
 
    predictions = { 
      "classes": tf.argmax(input=logits, axis=1), 
      "probabilities": tf.nn.softmax(logits, name="softmax_tensor") 
    } 
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    if mode == tf.estimator.ModeKeys.PREDICT: 
        return tf.estimator.EstimatorSpec(mode=mode, predictions=predictions) 
 
    loss = tf.losses.sparse_softmax_cross_entropy(labels=labels, logits=logits) 
 
    if mode == tf.estimator.ModeKeys.TRAIN: 
        optimizer = tf.train.GradientDescentOptimizer(learning_rate=0.001) 
        train_op = optimizer.minimize( 
            loss=loss, 
            global_step=tf.train.get_global_step()) 
        return tf.estimator.EstimatorSpec(mode=mode, loss=loss, train_op=train_op) 
 
    eval_metric_ops = { 
      "accuracy": tf.metrics.accuracy( 
          labels=labels, predictions=predictions["classes"])} 
    return tf.estimator.EstimatorSpec( 





    benign_data = 
pickle.load(open("/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binary_image/bi
n2img_B_input", "rb")) 
    benign_labels = 
pickle.load(open("/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binary_image/bi
n2img_B_output", "rb")) 
    malware_data = 
pickle.load(open("/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binary_image/bi
n2img_M_input", "rb")) 




    input_array = np.concatenate((benign_data, malware_data), axis=0) 
    output_array = np.concatenate((benign_labels, malware_labels), axis=0) 
 
    input_df=pd.DataFrame(input_array) 
    output_df=pd.DataFrame(output_array) 
 
    cross_val_num=10 
 
    for i in range(cross_val_num): 
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        X_train, x_test, Y_train, y_test = train_test_split(input_df, output_df, test_size = 
0.2, shuffle=True)  
 
        train_data=np.asarray(X_train) 
        train_labels=np.asarray(x_test) 
        eval_data=np.asarray(Y_train) 
        eval_labels=np.asarray(y_test)     
 
        bin2img_classifier = tf.estimator.Estimator( 




        tensors_to_log = {"probabilities": "softmax_tensor"} 
        logging_hook = tf.train.LoggingTensorHook( 
            tensors=tensors_to_log, every_n_iter=50) 
 
    # Training 
        train_input_fn = tf.estimator.inputs.numpy_input_fn( 
            x={"x": train_data}, 
            y=train_labels, 
            batch_size=100, 
            num_epochs=None, 
            shuffle=True) 
        bin2img_classifier.train( 
            input_fn=train_input_fn, 
            steps=20000, 
            hooks=[logging_hook]) 
 
    # Testing 
        eval_input_fn = tf.estimator.inputs.numpy_input_fn( 
            x={"x": eval_data}, 
            y=eval_labels, 
            num_epochs=1, 
            shuffle=False) 
        eval_results = bin2img_classifier.evaluate(input_fn=eval_input_fn) 
        print(eval_results) 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    main() 
 
 






import numpy as np 
import os   
import struct 
import pickle 
from collections import Counter 
 
benign_dir ='/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/Binaries/' 
















for b in range(2^8): 
    byte_hist1_B[int(b)]=0 
 
if gram2_run: 
    for b in range(2^16): 
        byte_hist2_B[int(b)]=0 
 
if gram3_run: 
    for b in range(2^24): 
        byte_hist3_B[int(b)]=0 
 
if gram4_run: 
    for b in range(2^32): 
        byte_hist4_B[int(b)]=0 
 
print('BENIGN START') 
for filename in os.listdir(benign_dir): 
    full_path = benign_dir + filename 
    if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
        with open(full_path,"rb") as binary_file: 
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            data=binary_file.read() 
 
            gram1=0 
            gram2=0 
            gram3=0 
            gram4=0 
 
            for byte in data: 
                gram1=ord(struct.unpack('c',byte)[0]) 
 
                if gram1 in byte_hist1_B: 
                 byte_hist1_B[gram1]+=1 
                else: 
                 byte_hist1_B[gram1]=1 
                if gram2_run: 
                 g2 = gram1 + gram2*256 
                 if g2 in byte_hist2_B: 
                  byte_hist2_B[g2]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist2_B[g2]=1 
                if gram3_run: 
                 g3 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 
                 if g3 in byte_hist3_B: 
                  byte_hist3_B[g3]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist3_B[g3]=1 
                if gram4_run: 
                 g4 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 + gram4*256*256*256 
                 if g4 in byte_hist4_B: 
                  byte_hist4_B[g4]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist4_B[g4]=1 
 
                gram4 = gram3 
                gram3 = gram2 
                gram2 = gram1 
 




gram1_meanB = np.mean(byte_hist1_B.values()) 
gram1_stdB = np.std(byte_hist1_B.values()) 






    gram2_meanB = np.mean(byte_hist2_B.values()) 
    gram2_stdB = np.std(byte_hist2_B.values()) 
    print('GRAM 2 Mean/std') 
    print(gram2_meanB) 
    print(gram2_stdB) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist2_B.items(): 
        byte_hist2_S3[key]=((value-gram2_meanB)/gram2_stdB)*10 
 
if gram3_run: 
    gram3_meanB = np.mean(byte_hist3_B.values()) 
    gram3_stdB = np.std(byte_hist3_B.values()) 
    print('GRAM 3 Mean/std') 
    print(gram3_meanB) 
    print(gram3_stdB) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist3_B.items(): 
        byte_hist3_S3[key]=((value-gram3_meanB)/gram3_stdB)*10 
 
if gram4_run: 
    gram4_meanB = np.mean(byte_hist4_B.values()) 
    gram4_stdB = np.std(byte_hist4_B.values()) 
    print('GRAM 4 Mean/std') 
    print(gram4_meanB) 
    print(gram4_stdB) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist4_B.items(): 







###   END BENIGN ANALYSIS   ### 










for filename in os.listdir(malware_dir): 
    full_path = malware_dir + filename 
    if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
        with open(full_path,"rb") as binary_file: 
            data=binary_file.read() 
 
            gram1=0 
            gram2=0 
            gram3=0 
            gram4=0 
 
            for byte in data: 
                gram1=ord(struct.unpack('c',byte)[0]) 
 
                if gram1 in byte_hist1_M: 
                 byte_hist1_M[gram1]+=1 
                else: 
                 byte_hist1_M[gram1]=1 
                if gram2_run: 
                 g2 = gram1 + gram2*256 
                 if g2 in byte_hist2_M: 
                  byte_hist2_M[g2]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist2_M[g2]=1 
                if gram3_run: 
                 g3 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 
                 if g3 in byte_hist3_M: 
                  byte_hist3_M[g3]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist3_M[g3]=1 
                if gram4_run: 
                 g4 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 + gram4*256*256*256 
                 if g4 in byte_hist4_M: 
                  byte_hist4_M[g4]+=1 
                 else: 
                  byte_hist4_M[g4]=1 
 
                gram4 = gram3 
                gram3 = gram2 
                gram2 = gram1 
 




print('GRAM 1 Mean/std') 
gram1_meanM = np.mean(byte_hist1_M.values()) 





    gram2_meanM = np.mean(byte_hist2_M.values()) 
    gram2_stdM = np.std(byte_hist2_M.values()) 
    print('GRAM 2 Mean/std') 
    print(gram2_meanM) 
    print(gram2_stdM) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist2_M.items(): 
        if key in byte_hist2_S3: 
            if (byte_hist2_S3[key]/10)/((value-gram2_meanM)/gram2_stdM)>1: 
                byte_hist2_S3[key]=(byte_hist2_S3[key]/10)/((value-
gram2_meanM)/gram2_stdM) 
            else: 
                byte_hist2_S3[key]=((value-
gram2_meanM)/gram2_stdM)/(byte_hist2_S3[key]/10) 
        else: 
            byte_hist2_S3[key]=10 
 
if gram3_run: 
    gram3_meanM = np.mean(byte_hist3_M.values()) 
    gram3_stdM = np.std(byte_hist3_M.values()) 
    print('GRAM 3 Mean/std') 
    print(gram3_meanM) 
    print(gram3_stdM) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist3_M.items(): 
        if key in byte_hist3_S3: 
 
            if (byte_hist3_S3[key]/10)/((value-gram3_meanM)/gram3_stdM)>1: 
                byte_hist3_S3[key]=(byte_hist3_S3[key]/10)/((value-
gram3_meanM)/gram3_stdM) 
            else: 
                byte_hist3_S3[key]=((value-
gram3_meanM)/gram3_stdM)/(byte_hist3_S3[key]/10) 
        else: 




    gram4_meanM = np.mean(byte_hist4_M.values()) 
    gram4_stdM = np.std(byte_hist4_M.values()) 
    print('GRAM 4 Mean/std') 
    print(gram4_meanM) 
    print(gram4_stdM) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist4_M.items(): 
     
        if key in byte_hist4_S3: 
            if (byte_hist4_S3[key]/10)/((value-gram4_meanM)/gram4_stdM)>1: 
                byte_hist4_S3[key]=(byte_hist4_S3[key]/10)/((value-
gram4_meanM)/gram4_stdM) 
            else: 
                byte_hist4_S3[key]=((value-
gram4_meanM)/gram4_stdM)/(byte_hist4_S3[key]/10) 
        else: 







###    END MALWARE ANALYSIS    ### 







    g2_mean = np.mean(byte_hist2_S3.values()) 
    g2_std = np.std(byte_hist2_S3.values()) 
 
    for key, value in byte_hist2_S3.items(): 
        if value>(g2_mean+3*g2_std) or value<(g2_mean-3*g2_std): 
            pickle_hist2_3[key]=1 
 
if gram3_run: 
    g3_mean = np.mean(byte_hist3_S3.values()) 
    g3_std = np.std(byte_hist3_S3.values()) 
 
    vc = Counter(byte_hist3_S3.itervalues()) 
    for key, value in vc.most_common(50): 




    g4_mean = np.mean(byte_hist4_S3.values()) 
    g4_std = np.std(byte_hist4_S3.values()) 
 
    vc = Counter(byte_hist4_S3.itervalues()) 
    for key, value in vc.most_common(100): 










    pickle.dump(pickle_hist2_3, open(pickle_hist2_3std, "wb")) 
if gram3_run: 
    pickle.dump(pickle_hist3_3, open(pickle_hist3_3std, "wb")) 
if gram4_run: 
    pickle.dump(pickle_hist4_3, open(pickle_hist4_3std, "wb")) 
 




import numpy as np 




































    benign_dir ='/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/Binaries/' 
    directory=benign_dir 
    output_value=0 
    
pickle_in="/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binarybytesCount_v2
2_B_input" 
    
pickle_out="/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binarybytesCount_v
22_B_output" 
    print('BENIGN START') 
 
if MALWARE: 
    malware_dir = '/home/james/Documents/Malware/Virus.Win/' 
    directory=malware_dir 
    output_value=1 
    
pickle_in="/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binarybytesCount_v2
2_M_input" 
    
pickle_out="/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/pickles/binarybytesCount_v
22_M_output" 
    print('MALWARE START') 
 
for filename in os.listdir(directory): 
    full_path = directory + filename 
    if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
        with open(full_path,"rb") as binary_file: 
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            del sample[:] 
            byte_hist1_B.clear() 
            byte_hist2_B.clear() 
            byte_hist3_B.clear() 
            byte_hist4_B.clear() 
            data=binary_file.read() 
            gram1=0 
            gram2=0 
            gram3=0 
            gram4=0 
            count = 0 
 
            for byte in data: 
                gram1=ord(struct.unpack('c',byte)[0]) 
                count += 1 
                if gram1 in byte_hist1_B: 
                 byte_hist1_B[gram1]+=1 
                else: 
                 byte_hist1_B[gram1]=1 
                if count>2: 
                    if gram2_run: 
                     g2 = gram1 + gram2*256 
                    if g2 in byte_hist2_B: 
                         byte_hist2_B[g2]+=1 
                    else: 
                         byte_hist2_B[g2]=1 
                if count>3: 
                    if gram3_run: 
                     g3 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 
                    if g3 in byte_hist3_B: 
                        byte_hist3_B[g3]+=1 
                    else: 
                        byte_hist3_B[g3]=1 
                if count>4: 
                    if gram4_run: 
                     g4 = gram1 + gram2*256 + gram3*256*256 + gram4*256*256*256 
                    if g4 in byte_hist4_B: 
                        byte_hist4_B[g4]+=1 
                    else: 
                        byte_hist4_B[g4]=1 
 
                gram4 = gram3 
                gram3 = gram2 
                gram2 = gram1 
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            binary_file.close() 
 
            for key,value in sorted(hist2_3std.items()): 
                if key in byte_hist2_B: 
                    sample.append(byte_hist2_B[key]) 
                else: 
                    sample.append(0) 
            for key,value in sorted(hist3_3std.items()): 
                if key in byte_hist3_B: 
                    sample.append(byte_hist3_B[key]) 
                else: 
                    sample.append(0) 
 
            for key,value in sorted(hist4_3std.items()): 
                if key in byte_hist4_B: 
                    sample.append(byte_hist4_B[key]) 
                else: 
                    sample.append(0) 
 
            nsample=np.array(sample) 
            inputs.append(np.copy(nsample)) 




pickle.dump(np_inputs, open(pickle_in, "wb")) 
pickle.dump(np_output, open(pickle_out, "wb")) 
 




import numpy as np 
import pandas as pd 
import seaborn as sns 
import pickle 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
 
from sklearn.neural_network import MLPClassifier 
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split 
from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score 
from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix 
from sklearn import metrics 


















input_array = np.concatenate((benign_data, malware_data), axis=0) 







for i in range(cross_val_num): 
    X_train, x_test, Y_train, y_test = train_test_split(input_df, output_df, test_size = 0.2, 
shuffle=True)  #consider shuffle=True 
 
    feature_size=len(input_array[1]) 
    first_hidden_layer=16 
    second_hidden_layer=4 
 
    classifier=MLPClassifier(solver='adam', alpha=0.001, 
hidden_layer_sizes=(first_hidden_layer,second_hidden_layer)) 
 
    print ("Training...") 
    classifier.fit(X_train,np.ravel(Y_train,order='C')) 
 
    print ("Predicting..") 
    y_pred=classifier.predict(x_test) 
     
    y_pred_proba=classifier.predict_proba(x_test)    
    y2_test=np.asarray(y_test) 
    prob_pred=[] 
    index=0 
    tp=0 
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    tp0B=[] 
    tp1M=[] 
    tn=0 
    tn0B=[] 
    tn1M=[] 
    fp=0 
    fp0B=[] 
    fp1M=[] 
    fn=0 
    fn0B=[] 
    fn1M=[] 
    for j in y_pred_proba: 
        print(j) 
        if j[1] > j[0]: 
            prob_pred.append(1) 
            if y2_test[index] == 1: 
                tp+=1 
                tp0B.append(j[0]) 
                tp1M.append(j[1]) 
            else: 
                fp+=1 
                fp0B.append(j[0]) 
                fp1M.append(j[1]) 
        else: 
            prob_pred.append(0) 
            if y2_test[index] == 0: 
                tn+=1 
                tn0B.append(j[0]) 
                tn1M.append(j[1]) 
            else: 
                fn+=1 
                fn0B.append(j[0]) 
                fn1M.append(j[1])       
        index+=1 
 
    print("Accuracy Score") 
    print(accuracy_score(y_test, y_pred)) 
    print("TP\t"+str(tp)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(tp0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(tp0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(tp1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(tp1M))) 
    print("TN\t"+str(tn)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(tn0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(tn0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(tn1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(tn1M))) 
    print("FP\t"+str(fp)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(fp0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(fp0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(fp1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(fp1M))) 
    print("FN\t"+str(fn)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(fn0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(fn0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(fn1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(fn1M))) 
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    print("Confusion Matrix") 
    cm = confusion_matrix(y_test, y_pred) 
    print(cm) 
    TN=float(cm[0,0]) 
    FP=float(cm[0,1]) 
    FN=float(cm[1,0]) 
    TP=float(cm[1,1]) 
    Precision=TP/(TP+FP) 
    print("Precision: " + str(Precision) +"%") 
    Recall=TP/(TP+FN) 
    print("Recall: " + str(Recall) + "%") 
    F_score=2*((Precision*Recall)/(Precision+Recall)) 
    print("F-score: " + str(F_score) + "%") 
 
# Model persistence 
pickle_clf="/home/james/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/models/binary_stats_MLP/n
_gram_stats" 
pickle.dump(classifier, open(pickle_clf, "wb")) 
 
 






















for analyses_num in range(1,5808): 
 
    report_json=analysis_dir + str(analyses_num) + report_file 
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    data = json.load(open(report_json)) 
 
    for imports in data['static']['pe_imports']: 
        dll=imports['dll'] 
        if analyses_num < 3252: 
            #Malware 
            if dll in m_dll: 
                m_dll[dll]+=1 
            else: 
                m_dll[dll]=1 
        else: 
            #Benign 
            if dll in b_dll: 
                b_dll[dll]+=1 
            else: 
                b_dll[dll]=1 
 
        for name in imports['imports']: 
            call=name['name'] 
            if analyses_num < 3252: 
                #Malware 
                if call in m_call: 
                    m_call[call]+=1 
                else: 
                    m_call[call]=1 
            else: 
                #Benign 
                if call in b_call: 
                    b_call[call]+=1 
                else: 
                    b_call[call]=1 
 
    number_of_sections=0 
    for imports in data['static']['pe_sections']: 
        section=imports['name'] 
        entropy=imports['entropy'] 
        number_of_sections+=1 
 
        if analyses_num < 3252: 
            #Malware 
            if section in m_section: 
                m_section[section]+=1 
            else: 
                m_section[section]=1 
        else: 
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            #Benign 
            if section in b_section: 
                b_section[section]+=1 
            else: 
                b_section[section]=1 
 
    if analyses_num < 3252: 
        #Malware 
        if number_of_sections in m_num_sections: 
            m_num_sections[number_of_sections]+=1 
        else: 
            m_num_sections[number_of_sections]=1 
    else: 
        #Benign 
        if number_of_sections in b_num_sections: 
            b_num_sections[number_of_sections]+=1 
        else: 






freq=1300 # Results in Top 10 DLL/Section names 
malware=1 
benign=0 
for key,value in sorted(m_dll.items()): 
    if value >= freq: 
        feat_dict[key]=1 
 
for key,value in sorted(m_section.items()): 
    if value >= freq: 
        feat_dict[key]=1 
 
for key,value in sorted(b_dll.items()): 
    if value >= freq: 
        feat_dict[key]=1 
 
for key,value in sorted(b_section.items()): 
    if value >= freq: 
        feat_dict[key]=1 
 
for key,value in feat_dict.items(): 







pickle.dump(np_inputs, open(pickle_in, "wb")) 
 
 































for analyses_num in range(1,5808): 
 
    report_json=analysis_dir + str(analyses_num) + report_file 
    data = json.load(open(report_json)) 
    a_feats.clear() 
    del sample[:] 
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    for imports in data['static']['pe_imports']: 
        dll=imports['dll'] 
        a_feats[dll]=1 
 
        for name in imports['imports']: 
            call=name['name'] 
            a_feats[call]=1 
 
    number_of_sections=0 
    avg_entropy=0 
 
    for imports in data['static']['pe_sections']: 
        section=imports['name'] 
        entropy=imports['entropy'] 
        number_of_sections+=1 
        avg_entropy+=float(entropy) 
        a_feats[section]=1 
 
    for i in range(len(feature_set)): 
        if feature_set[i] in a_feats: 
            sample.append(1) 
        else: 
            sample.append(0) 
 
    sample.append(number_of_sections) 
    sample.append((avg_entropy/number_of_sections)) 
    np_sample=np.array(sample) 
    feature_array.append(np.copy(np_sample)) 
 
    if analyses_num < 3252: 
        output_array.append(1) 
    else: 








pickle.dump(np_inputs, open(pickle_in, "wb")) 









import numpy as np 
import pandas as pd 
import seaborn as sns 
import pickle 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
 
from sklearn.neural_network import MLPClassifier 
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split 
from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score 
from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix 
from sklearn import metrics 















for i in range(cross_val_num): 
    X_train, x_test, Y_train, y_test = train_test_split(input_df, output_df, test_size = 0.2, 
shuffle=True)  #consider shuffle=True 
 
    feature_size=len(input_array[1]) 
    first_hidden_layer=feature_size 
    second_hidden_layer=first_hidden_layer/2 
    third_hidden_layer=second_hidden_layer/2 
 
    classifier=MLPClassifier(solver='adam', alpha=0.001, 
hidden_layer_sizes=(first_hidden_layer,second_hidden_layer)) 
 
    print ("Training...") 
    classifier.fit(X_train,np.ravel(Y_train,order='C')) 
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    print ("Predicting..") 
    y_pred=classifier.predict(x_test) 
 
    y_pred_proba=classifier.predict_proba(x_test) 
    y2_test=np.asarray(y_test) 
    prob_pred=[] 
    index=0 
    tp=0 
    tp0B=[] 
    tp1M=[] 
    tn=0 
    tn0B=[] 
    tn1M=[] 
    fp=0 
    fp0B=[] 
    fp1M=[] 
    fn=0 
    fn0B=[] 
    fn1M=[] 
    for j in y_pred_proba: 
        if j[1] > j[0]: 
            prob_pred.append(1) 
            if y2_test[index] == 1: 
                tp+=1 
                tp0B.append(j[0]) 
                tp1M.append(j[1]) 
            else: 
                fp+=1 
                fp0B.append(j[0]) 
                fp1M.append(j[1]) 
        else: 
            prob_pred.append(0) 
            if y2_test[index] == 0: 
                tn+=1 
                tn0B.append(j[0]) 
                tn1M.append(j[1]) 
            else: 
                fn+=1 
                fn0B.append(j[0]) 
                fn1M.append(j[1])    
        index+=1 
 
    print("Accuracy Score") 
    print(accuracy_score(y_test, y_pred)) 
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    print("TP\t"+str(tp)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(tp0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(tp0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(tp1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(tp1M))) 
    print("TN\t"+str(tn)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(tn0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(tn0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(tn1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(tn1M))) 
    print("FP\t"+str(fp)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(fp0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(fp0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(fp1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(fp1M))) 
    print("FN\t"+str(fn)+"\tBenign(0): "+str(np.mean(fn0B)) + " +-
"+str(np.std(fn0B))+"\tMalware(1): "+str(np.mean(fn1M))+" +-"+str(np.std(fn1M))) 
    print("Confusion Matrix") 
    cm = confusion_matrix(y_test, y_pred) 
    print(cm) 
    TN=float(cm[0,0]) 
    FP=float(cm[0,1]) 
    FN=float(cm[1,0]) 
    TP=float(cm[1,1]) 
    Precision=TP/(TP+FP) 
    print("Precision: " + str(Precision) +"%") 
    Recall=TP/(TP+FN) 
    print("Recall: " + str(Recall) + "%") 
    F_score=2*((Precision*Recall)/(Precision+Recall)) 
    print("F-score: " + str(F_score) + "%") 
 
# Model persistence 
pickle_clf="/home/nps/Desktop/CNN_Malware_Analysis/models/binary_lib_MLP/pe_js
on" + str(freq) 
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